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The Dialectics of Bank Capital: Regulation and
Regulatory Capital Arbitrage
Erik F. Gerding*
I. INTRODUCTION
Bank capital regulation has surprisingly moved from being a critical
but boring tool of banking law to a politically contentious topic of
national debate. Anat Admati and Martin Hellwig’s book, 1 which
advocates for much higher capital requirements for banks, has received
scholarly plaudits. 2 On the other hand, senior executives of large Wall
Street banks have attacked proposals for higher capital requirements as
threatening economic growth. 3 On the presidential campaign trail, two
prominent Republican candidates made higher capital requirements a
Bank capital
centerpiece of their financial reform proposals. 4
regulations have attracted a wave of excellent legal scholarship on how
regulators have made these rules, 5 how they have enforced them, 6 and
how policymakers ought to rethink the baseline for regulation. 7
In considering the history and efficacy of capital regulations, one
dynamic deserves much more academic attention than it has received—
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Colorado Law
School.
1. See generally ANAT ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S
WRONG WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2013).
2. John Crawford, Capital Accounts: Bank Capital, Crises, and the Determinants of an
Optimal Regulatory Approach, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 1161, 1162–63 (2015) (citing academic reviews of
Admati and Hellwig’s book).
3. E.g., Tom Braithwaite, Dimon Warns of Bank ‘Nail in Coffin’, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2011),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/3157bcbe-5b05-11e0-a290-00144feab49a.html#axzz41m5ZgROX
[https://perma.cc/W5YF-V88H].
4. Peter Schroeder, Cruz, Kasich Spar on Bank Bailouts, THEHILL.COM, (Nov. 10, 2015)
http://thehill.com/policy/finance/259783-cruz-kasich-spar-on-bank-bailouts
[https://perma.cc/37Z2SP62] (describing views of Ohio Governor John Kasich and former Florida Governor Jeb Bush);
Mark Gimein, The 8 Weirdest Economic Ideas of the Republican Debate, TIME.COM (Nov. 11, 2015).
http://time.com/money/4107879/republican-debate-milwaukee-fox-weird-economic-ideas/
[https://perma.cc/BLM3-HWNM].
5. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, How Do Bank Regulators Determine Capital-Adequacy
Requirements?, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1853 (2015).
6. See, e.g., Julie Andersen Hill, Bank Capital Regulation by Enforcement: An Empirical
Study, 87 IND. L.J. 645 (2012).
7. See, e.g., Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Top-Down Bank Capital Regulation, 55 WASHBURN
L.J. 327 (2016); Brett H. McDonnell, The Promise and Perils of Top-Down Capital Regulation, 55
WASHBURN L.J. 385 (2016).
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the ways in which financial institutions game these legal rules. The
strategies financial institutions use to avoid capital requirements—
known collectively as regulatory capital arbitrage—merit closer study
for at least two crucial reasons. 8 First, regulatory capital arbitrage
diminishes the effectiveness of bank capital rules. 9 This is of great
concern to the extent that bank capital regulation mitigates the
externalities of bank failures on the broader economy. Lower levels of
capital and higher levels of leverage leave banks dangerously exposed to
However, regulatory capital arbitrage may
economic shocks. 10
camouflage this risk and give the illusion that banks enjoy a significant
capital buffer and can weather a financial storm. 11 Indeed, some
economists argue that regulatory capital arbitrage may have
exacerbated the severity of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008.
Prominent banks that had seemingly sufficient levels of capital
nonetheless failed or required government lifelines. The gaming of
regulation meant that the effective leverage of these banks and their
actual fragility may have been much higher than they appeared. 12
Second, regulatory capital arbitrage helps explain the evolution of
bank capital rules. Indeed, bank capital regulation has evolved in an
almost lockstep dialectical manner with regulatory capital arbitrage.
Each enactment by policymakers of new capital rules has engendered
new strategies by financial institutions to game those rules. This gives
birth to a new generation of rules, as policymakers attempt to close
loopholes and make bank capital rules more closely match the economic
reality of bank balance sheets and bank risk-taking. 13
However, the form of bank regulations may never match exactly
the substance of bank risk.
This stems in part from the
“incompleteness” of legal rules. Incompleteness provides a fancy term
for describing how laws have jurisdictional boundaries (e.g., regulators
in Italy have only limited application in Japan) and how the text of legal
rules cannot cover every potential future state of the world and every
possible behavioral reaction to those rules. 14 Moreover, financial
8. For an early, influential, and prescient account of regulatory capital arbitrage, see David
Jones, Emerging Problems with the Basel Capital Accord: Regulatory Capital Arbitrage and Related
Issues, 24 J. BANKING & FIN. 35 (2000).
9. Id. at 37.
10. Schooner, supra note 7, at 330–31; ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 1.
11. Jones, supra note 8, at 36.
12. Infra Part V.
13. Infra Part III.
14. Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Incomplete Law, 35 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 931, 931
(2003). Pistor and Xu argue that incompleteness may take many forms. Id. at 932–33. Legal rules
may be incomplete because they attempt to regulate comprehensively a set of activities but omit
some substantively equivalent actions. Id. Other legal rules are incomplete because of vague or
ambiguous language which leaves the boundaries of legal rules unclear. Id. Pistor and Xu describe
how incompleteness can result not only from bad legislative drafting, but also because of
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institutions have strong incentives to react to bank capital rules by
devising new strategies of regulatory capital arbitrage. If bank failures
impose a negative externality on the economy, rules that attempt to
internalize those costs on banks and their shareholders and managers
may be inherently unstable. 15
This Article attempts to cast more light on regulatory capital
arbitrage, by outlining why and how banks engage in regulatory capital
arbitrage and briefly sketching out how capital regulation and
regulatory capital arbitrage have evolved in dialectical fashion. This
Article concludes by describing and evaluating two broad approaches to
dealing with the dynamic and unstable nature of capital rules (i.e. their
constant erosion by regulatory capital arbitrage). The first approach—
exemplified by the scholars like Anat Admati, Martin Hellwig, 16 and,
elsewhere in this Issue, Heidi Mandanis Schooner—is to enact simple,
broad brush rules. For Admati and Hellwig, this takes the form of much
higher and blunter capital requirements. Professor Schooner adds an
additional nuance in her Article in this Issue. She argues that
policymakers should have a different baseline for capital regulations.
Instead of incrementally increasing capital regulations over time,
policymakers could have a presumption, anchored in the high finance of
the Modigliani-Miller theorem, 17 of high capital levels. Regulators
could then allow an individual bank to present evidence that its risktaking and probability of failure are low enough to justify lowering the
capital requirement. 18
The second approach to addressing the recurring problem and
evolving nature of regulatory capital arbitrage is to match complexity
with complexity. Policymakers could accept regulatory capital arbitrage
and the constant evolution of financial institutions, markets, and
investments, and in response, policymakers can dynamically adjust rules
to reflect these realities. That would require, however, that regulators
possess the capacities and incentives both to track bank risk-taking and
regulatory capital arbitrage and to adjust capital rules in a prompt and
appropriate manner.
Before launching into this Article, it may help to clarify some
technological or social changes, or because legal drafters deliberately made legal rules ambiguous
(whether for political reasons or to allow courts and agencies to fill in gaps). Id.
This account of incomplete legal rules has a mirror image in legal and economic scholarship on
“incomplete” contracts. See, e.g., Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts,
66 REV. ECON. STUD. 115 (1999) (providing theoretical economic framework for analysis of
incomplete contracts); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989).
15. See Jones, supra note 8, at 36.
16. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 1.
17. See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text (explaining the Modigliani-Miller theorem).
18. Schooner, supra note 7, at 329.
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terminology. Regulatory arbitrage as a general phenomenon has
received increasing attention in legal scholarship. 19 One might think of
this term as simply a “high falutin’” label for how individuals or firms
game or sidestep regulations. However, it is helpful to see just how
regulatory arbitrage strategies work in practice and how complex they
can become. It is also useful to think of regulatory arbitrage as two
interconnected dynamics: 20
Investment switching. In the face of regulatory restrictions that might
lower or foreclose investment returns, investors and financial institutions
divert to alternative channels for making investments or obtaining credit
that are subject to lower regulatory taxes. Investment switching often
involves moving capital to parallel financial markets or other legal
jurisdictions that offer close economic substitutes for a loan or investment
but impose lower regulatory taxes. 21
Investment structuring. Financial institutions or sophisticated investors
also engage lawyers and other advisers (accountants, bankers, etc.) to
develop legal structures to exploit the incompleteness of financial
regulation. Legal innovation provides these parties with regulatory
“work-arounds.”
These legal structures creatively interpret legal
definitions and exemptions to avoid the application of regulatory
restrictions to a particular investment or source of credit. Work-arounds
allow market participants to enjoy the same economic benefits of a loan
or investment at a lower regulatory “tax rate.” Developing regulatory
“work-arounds” for clients represents an essential role of transactional
and regulatory attorneys, whom Professor Ronald Gilson famously called
“transaction cost engineers.” By lowering transaction costs, Gilson argues
that lawyers facilitate the efficient pricing of assets. 22

These two techniques are by no means mutually exclusive. Indeed,
investment structuring—novel forms of transactions—often facilitates
investment switching. For example, in another financial regulatory
context, American Depository Receipts (“ADRs”) are instruments that
represent an interest in the securities of a non-U.S. company. These
ADRs trade on U.S. financial markets and enable U.S. investors to
invest in foreign companies without having to purchase shares directly
on a foreign exchange. 23
Regulatory arbitrage is distinct from
19. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010).
20. ERIK. F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 236–37 (2013).
21. Id. at 236–37 (describing investment switching); id. at 241–43 (describing factors that
influence the decision by an individual or a firm to engage in investment switching).
22. Id. at 237 (describing investment structuring); id. at 243–46 (describing factors that influence
the decision by an individual or a firm to engage in investment structuring). See Ronald J. Gilson,
Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 243 (1984).
Gilson’s conclusion applies to transaction cost engineering, not regulatory arbitrage. The arbitrage of
a regulation only makes the pricing of an asset more efficient when that regulation is welfare
reducing. Undermining capital regulations that mitigate systemic risk might make capital rules less
costly for firms, but more costly for society.
23. Brian P. Murray & Maurice Pesso, The Accident of Efficiency: Foreign Exchanges,
American Depository Receipts, and Space Arbitrage, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 383, 389 (2003) (describing
American Deposit Receipts (“ADRs”)). Some economists have found that ADRs may enable
financial arbitrage of foreign company securities, as arbitrageurs exploit price differences between a
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deregulation. The former is a decision by regulated firms or individuals
to avoid regulation to lower their effective regulatory tax rate, while the
latter is a choice by regulators to change the content or enforcement of
legal rules also to lower the effective regulatory tax rate. 24 Nonetheless,
increased regulatory arbitrage and deregulation may create feedback
effects for one another. 25
Regulatory capital arbitrage occurs when financial institutions or
their investors engage in either investment switching or investment
structuring to avoid or lower the effectiveness of regulatory capital
requirements. This translates into financial institutions having higher
effective leverage or making riskier investments with the same amount
of leverage. As mentioned above, and as this Article further describes,
regulatory capital arbitrage played a crucial role in leaving financial
institutions more exposed to the subprime crisis and the larger Global
Financial Crisis. 26
This Article proceeds as follows, Part II answers a fundamental
question about regulatory capital arbitrage: why do banks seek to
engage in it? Part III sketches a high-level history of the development
of bank capital regulations as an evolutionary/dialectical response to
regulatory capital arbitrage. Part IV examines how financial institutions
engage in regulatory capital arbitrage, outlining some of the strategies,
financial products, and transaction structures that financial institutions
have used to sidestep the full brunt of these rules and to increase their
leverage. Part V summarizes some of the evidence of the extent that
firms engaged in regulatory capital arbitrage in the years before the
Financial Crisis of 2008 and the consequences of that gamesmanship
during the Crisis. Part VI frames the dialectics of capital regulation and
regulatory capital arbitrage in terms of research into complex adaptive
systems. Part VI also describes how capital regulations may be
inherently unstable, and it outlines the simple and high tech approaches
to this instability and the challenge of regulatory capital arbitrage.

company’s ADRs and equivalent amounts of its stock traded on foreign exchanges. Mahmoud
Wahab et al., Arbitrage Opportunities in the American Depository Receipts Market Revisited, 2 J.
INT’L. FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & MONEY 97 (1993).
24. Cf. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 20, at 64
(contrasting deregulation with “regulatory stimulus,” which describes a broader range or actions by
government officials to promote investment or lending, including repealing or rolling back legal rules,
granting exemptions or waivers from legal rules, changing legal interpretations, lowering
enforcement, or other actions).
25. Erik F. Gerding, Deregulation Pas de Deux: Dual Regulatory Classes of Financial
Institutions and the Path to Financial Crisis in Sweden and the United States, 15 NEXUS: CHAPMAN
J.L. POL’Y 135 (2010).
26. See infra Part V.
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II. THE WHY OF REGULATORY CAPITAL ARBITRAGE
A great deal of recent scholarship has looked at ways to reform
capital rules. Some of this has even noted the propensity of financial
institutions to game and thus erode the effectiveness of bank capital
regulations. However, fewer scholars have asked the all-important
question: why? In other words, why are banks so intent on increasing
their leverage and sidestepping rules that constrain that leverage?
Furthermore, when regulations cap overall bank leverage, why do banks
respond by making riskier investments?

A. Capital Requirements as Regulatory Tax
To understand first why, and later how, banks engaged in this form
of regulatory arbitrage, it is critical first to highlight the functions of
capital regulations. Regulatory capital requirements require that a
financial institution retain a certain amount of equity based on the
amount of assets it owns. 27 The regulatory capital cushion has two
interrelated functions. First, it protects the bank from unexpected losses
on its investments. 28 Lowering the risk of bank insolvency mitigates the
negative externalities of bank failures on financial markets, as well as on
the firms and taxpayers who fund government guarantees of banks,
explicit or implicit. 29 Second, bank capital requirements reduce a firm’s
leverage. 30 Increased leverage of financial institutions not only leaves
those firms more exposed to economic shocks and insolvency, it also can
increase the effective supply of money in the economy and add fuel to
asset price booms and bubbles. 31
When regulations require banks to maintain more capital than they
would when subject solely to market discipline (i.e. the level of capital
that their creditors and investors would demand), banks view these
requirements as a form of regulatory taxation. 32 As they do with respect
to other forms of taxation, banks incur structuring costs to reduce the
regulatory burden imposed by capital requirements. 33 The goal of this
27. JEFF MADURA, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 492 (9th ed. 2010).
28. Id.
29. See Richard Herring & Til Schuermann, Capital Regulation for Position Risk in Banks,
Securities Firms, and Insurance Companies, in CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL: BANKING,
SECURITIES, AND INSURANCE 15, 19 (Hal S. Scott ed., 2005) (describing rationale for capital
adequacy rules of reducing systemic risk); STEPHANIE M. STULZ, BANK CAPITAL AND RISK-TAKING:
THE IMPACT OF CAPITAL REGULATION, CHARTER VALUE, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 11 (2007)
(describing literature on capital requirements mediating moral hazard of deposit insurance).
30. Viral V. Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, in
REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND THE NEW ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL
FINANCE 143, 146–47 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter Acharya et al., Capital,
Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements].
31. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 20, at 366–68.
32. Jones, supra note 8, at 36.
33. Id. at 38–39.
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arbitrage—called regulatory capital arbitrage—is to enable firms to
reduce their capital ratios for regulatory purposes but without a
corresponding reduction in economic risk (or to maintain regulatory
capital ratios while increasing economic risk). 34 Regulatory arbitrage
may reduce a firm’s cost of capital and make more capital available to
be deployed elsewhere. 35

B. Cheap Debt: Government Guarantees, Systemic Risk, and the
Instability of Regulatory Capital Requirements
Financial institutions have tremendous incentives to game capital
requirements and increase their leverage because of the relative
inexpensiveness of debt to equity financing for them. 36 Yet the
cheapness of debt for financial institutions violates the ModiglianiMiller theorem on corporate finance. This theory holds that, under
certain assumptions, a firm should have the same cost of financing
whether it finances itself entirely through equity, entirely through debt,
or with any mix of the two. 37 Several factors may explain why debt is
cheaper than equity for financial institutions. 38 The tax-deductibility of
interest payments on debt creates one distortion. 39
Government guarantees of financial institutions—whether explicit
or implicit—provide another powerful force that makes debt cheaper
than equity. By offering to bail out financial institution creditors, these
guarantees make debt relatively cheap. Like black holes, guarantees
exert a powerful gravitational pull towards leverage that warps
regulatory and market space. Financial institutions have powerful
incentives to exploit these guarantees and arbitrage capital
requirements. 40
Attempting to remove these guarantees may not provide a realistic

34.
35.
36.
37.

See id. at 36, 38–39.
Id. at 38–40.
Acharya et al., supra note 30, at 157.

Franco Modigliani & Merton H. Miller, The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the
Theory of Investment, 48 AM. ECON. REV. 261 (1958).

38. For a comprehensive analysis of when the assumptions of the Modigliani-Miller theorem do
not hold, see Peter H. Huang & Michael S. Knoll, Corporate Finance, Corporate Law and Finance
Theory, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 175, 177–80 (2000) (presenting the “reverse” Modigliani-Miller theorem).
39. Tax Reform and the Tax Treatment of Debt and Equity, Joint Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Fin. & H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 112th Cong. 6 (July 13, 2011) (statement of Victor
Fleischer,
Assoc.
Professor,
U.
Colo.
L.
Sch.)
http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Fleischer%20Testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7XEDX6TC]. Professor Fleischer cites the use of hybrid instruments, such as trust preferred, as evidence
that the asymmetrical tax treatment of debt and equity induces leverage. Id. at 9. These hybrid
instruments are discussed below. See infra notes 60–62 and accompanying text.
40. See Acharya et al., supra note 30, at 157; Allen N. Berger et al., The Role of Capital in
Financial Institutions, 19 J. BANKING & FIN. 393 (1995). See also Robert C. Merton & Zvi Bodie, On
the Management of Financial Guarantees, 21 FIN. MGMT. 87, 95–96 (1992) (discussing limitations of
capital requirements as means that guarantor can govern the debtor).
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remedy. Governments provide these guarantees to mitigate systemic
risk and to lower the cost of bank failures that are externalized on
financial markets. 41 Policymakers cannot credibly forswear government
guarantees and bailouts altogether because of these potential systemic
externalities of bank failures. 42 These externalities and the prospect of
government bailouts make financial regulation inherently unstable
because of moral hazard (which, because of the Financial Crisis and
government bailouts, is a concept many taxpayers now understand all
too well). 43 Indeed, governments impose capital requirements to
mitigate the moral hazard of financial institutions taking excessive risk
at the ultimate expense of taxpayers. 44 However, the prospect of
government guarantees rescuing creditors of financial institutions makes
debt relatively cheap and creates powerful incentives for financial
institutions to game these capital requirements and increase leverage.
Financial institution leverage has effects beyond moral hazard.
This leverage feeds asset price bubbles by increasing the effective
money supply. Rising prices can cover up market mispricing of risk.
Leverage also leaves individual financial institutions and entire financial
markets more susceptible to economic downturns. 45
Implicit government guarantees can become self-fulfilling
prophecies. The widespread belief in the marketplace that the
government will bail out the creditors of a financial institution will lead
creditors to over-lend to that institution. If the level of lending becomes
large enough, the risk of the institution failing may threaten the stability
of financial markets generally. This creates strong pressure on the
government to provide an actual bailout. The same logic applies to
lending to entire classes of financial institutions. If creditors think the
government will guarantee an entire class of institutions, lending to that
class will increase. The government may not see an economically,
politically, or legally principled way to bail out some institutions in the
class but not others. 46

41. See id.; see also Viral Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21
CRIT. REV. 195, 197–98 (2009).
42. Acharya et al., supra note 30, at 157.
43. See Matthew Richardson, Large Banks and the Volcker Rule, in REGULATING WALL
STREET, supra note 30, at 181, 184.
44. See Herring & Schuermann, supra note 29, at 19 (describing rationale for capital adequacy
rules of reducing systemic risk); STULZ, supra note 29, at 11 (describing literature on capital
requirements mediating moral hazard of deposit insurance).
45. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 20, at 383–85.
46. Id. at 324–26.
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III. HISTORICAL DIALECTICS: THE BASEL ACCORDS AND
REGULATORY CAPITAL ARBITRAGE
This primal impulse of financial institutions to escape capital
requirements shaped the development of international and national
banking regulation. A brief history of the Basel Accords, a set of
international agreements among bank regulators, reveals that capital
regulations and regulatory capital arbitrage co-evolved in a dialectical
manner. 47 The evolution of capital requirements provides a prime
example of a “regulatory dialectic” described by Edward Kane in 1986.
Kane argued that financial innovation responds to regulator actions;
regulators, in turn, adjust regulations in light of financial innovation. 48
In the 1980s, bank regulators in several nations (members of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) became concerned about the
prospect of an international race-to-the-bottom in regulatory capital
requirements for banks. The regulators feared banks in countries with
lower capital regulations would gain a competitive advantage and would
attract cross-border capital flows. In other words, regulators worried
about the effects of massive investment switching on bank regulation,
bank stability, and the risk of cross-border financial crises. These
concerns animated the creation of the Basel I Accord. 49
In 1988, bank regulators in various countries agreed to set
recommended minimum capital requirements for banks in their
jurisdictions that were ultimately adopted by the G-10 countries. 50
47. Basel I and II are accords among bank regulators and central bankers from countries that
belong to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (members come from the so-called “Group
of Ten” countries: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Each Accord consists of a series of
recommended bank regulations and principles that national regulators should implement in their
home countries. Each Accord thus attempts to set minimum international banking standards to
mitigate both regulatory arbitrage by international banks and the financial risks caused by bank
failure that could spread from one economy to another. For capsule summaries of the Basel
Accords, see generally Robert F. Hugi et al., U.S. Adoption of Basel II and the Basel II
Securitization Framework, 12 N.C. BANKING INST. 45 (2008); Eric Y. Wu, Basel II: A Revised
Framework, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 150 (2005).
Although non-binding, national regulators exert pressure on one another to comply with the
Accord, giving it the quality of “soft law.” See Michael S. Barr & Geoffrey P. Miller, Global
Administrative Law: The View from Basel, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 15, 17 (2006) (reciting critiques of lawmaking by networks of bank regulators and international bureaucrats in the Basel Accord, including
that the process lacks accountability and legitimacy, but arguing that Basel II is subject to a subtle
structure of international administrative law); Dieter Kerwer, Rules that Many Use: Standards and
Global Regulation, 18 GOVERNANCE 611 (2005).
48. Edward J. Kane, Technology and the Regulation of Financial Markets, in TECHNOLOGY
AND THE REGULATION OF FINANCIAL MARKETS: SECURITIES, FUTURES AND BANKING 187
(Anthony Saunders & Lawrence J. White eds. 1986).
49. For historical background on adoption of the original Basel Accord, see Joseph Jude
Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: A Legitimate Regulatory Concern for Prudential Supervision
of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1299, 1336–42 (1989). See also JONATHAN R. MACEY ET
AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 281–82 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing history of U.S. risk-based
capital standards leading to Basel I).
50. CHARLES GOODHART, THE BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION: A HISTORY OF
THE EARLY YEARS 1974–1997 170, 180–81, 190–91 (2011) (detailing history of adoption of Basel I).
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Basel I established regulatory capital requirements for the credit risk
exposure of banks. 51 The Basel I rules required that certain large banks
maintain capital equal to 8% of the value of their risk-weighted assets. 52
The framers of the first Basel Accord also came to fear that banks
would game simple leverage caps by stuffing riskier assets into their
balance sheets. Banks would meet the leverage cap, but their risk of
failure would be much higher. The drafters recognized that not all
assets posed equal credit risk, and created different regulatory
categories (or “buckets”) for assets based on their perceived credit risk.
Assets that posed minimal credit risk required zero capital. On the
other end of the spectrum, higher credit risk assets required 100%
capital. 53
This crude approach of placing assets into risk buckets created
problems. The regulatory risk weights did not match the true economic
risk that assets posed for banks. In many cases, the actual credit risk
was lower than the risk reflected in the regulatory weight, which created
strong incentives for banks to engage in regulatory capital arbitrage
(including through the techniques described below in Part IV). 54
To remedy the failings of Basel I, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision drafted the Basel II Accord. 55 This second agreement
supplemented the Basel I Accord (the risk-bucket approach was
tweaked, but remains in place for many banks) and allowed certain
large banks to set their capital requirements according to the bank’s
own proprietary risk models. The Accord’s drafters created this policy
innovation on the theory that these models would better reflect the true
economic risk faced by large banks. Theoretically, the freedom to set
risk capital according to their own models would not only enable banks
to deploy capital more efficiently, it would also curb their incentives to
engage in regulatory capital arbitrage. 56
51. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT
AND
CAPITAL
STANDARDS
(1998),
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf?noframes=1
[https://perma.cc/AT3D-MV96]
[hereinafter
BASEL I].
52. Id. at 13.
53. Id. at 7–8 (establishing risk weight system).
54. Raj Bhala, Applying Equilibrium Theory and the FICAS Model: A Case Study of Capital
Adequacy and Currency Trading, 41 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 125, 159–62, 178, 183–87 (1997) (detailing
arguments for superiority of banks’ internal models to measure risk and set capital requirements
compared to regulatory methods).
55. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK COMPREHENSIVE VERSION
(2006), http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5UP-PSS5] [hereinafter BASEL II].
Basel II allowed certain large banks to use proprietary risk models to set their capital requirements
for not only credit risk, id. at 59–60, but market risk, id. at 191–203, and operational risk, id. at 147, as
well.
56. See Joseph J. Norton, A Perceived Trend in Modern International Financial Regulation:
Increasing Reliance on a Public-Private Partnership, 37 INT’L LAW 43, 53–58 (2003) (discussing
mechanics and rationale for Basel II). See also Bhala, supra note 54 (providing arguments for use of
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However, as we will see, banks and other financial institutions
found ways to game these rules and used the internal-model approach to
increase their leverage dramatically. 57 In December 2010, the Basel
Committee responded to the flaws in Basel II, which were exposed by
the Panic of 2007–2008 with a third accord, Basel III. 58 Basel III ramps
up the complexity of capital requirements by requiring that banks
maintain capital against a wider range of risks (e.g., liquidity risk) and
by setting intricate, even convoluted formulae for calculating those
separate capital cushions. Time will tell how banks will arbitrage this
third Basel incarnation.
IV. THE “HOW” OF REGULATORY CAPITAL ARBITRAGE

A. Financial Instruments as Tools of Regulatory Capital Arbitrage
Banks and other financial institutions game the types of capital
requirements envisioned by Basel I and II in a number of ways. The
most important forms of regulatory capital arbitrage have involved
various types of investment structuring facilitated by securitization and
derivatives. 59
Regulatory capital arbitrage generally entails banks gaming
traditional bank capital ratios by playing with the numerator and
denominator of those ratios. 60 Simple regulatory capital requirements
mandate that financial institutions maintain a capital ratio comprised of
equity in the numerator and assets in the denominator. 61 The Basel I
and Basel II accords contained complex rules for what types of equity
instruments could count towards the numerator. 62 As noted above, the
Accords also required different ratios of capital for different categories
of assets in the denominator, depending on the believed riskiness of the
assets. 63
Banks could game these traditional capital rules by cosmetically
internal models approach).
57. Infra Part IV.B; Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of
Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127, 159,
180–82 (2009) [hereinafter Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source].
58. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK
FOR
MORE
RESILIENT
BANKS
AND
BANKING
SYSTEMS
(2010)
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189_dec2010.pdf https://perma.cc/LZQ5-4LLX].
59. Some senior regulators recognized this potential and expressed concern as early as 1998.
E.g., Laurence H. Meyer, Governor, Fin. Globalization & Efficient Banking Regulation, Remarks at
the Annual Washington Conference of the Institute of International Bankers (Mar. 2, 1998).
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1998/19980302.htm
[https://perma.cc/9VLVKGGK].
60. Jones, supra note 8, at 36.
61. MADURA, supra note 27, at 429.
62. See Benton E. Gup, Capital Games, in CAPITAL MARKETS, GLOBALIZATION, AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 17 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2005).
63. Id.
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increasing the numerator in the ratio— for example, through gains
trading or under-provisioning for loan loss reserves. 64 Banks also
gamed the numerator by developing hybrid securities, such as trust
preferred securities. These securities are treated like debt for tax
purposes (with interest payments being subject to tax deductions), but
as capital for bank regulatory purposes. 65 Trust preferred securities had
debt-like features, including required “interest” payments to holders
(with some ability of the bank to defer payments for limited time
periods). 66 Commentators have faulted the performance of these
instruments during the Financial Crisis. The responsibility of banks to
make “debt payments” combined with a freeze in the market for
issuances of trust preferred securities during the Crisis underscored that
these securities did not provide the same cushion against losses as plain
vanilla equity. 67
The games that banks have played with the numerator of
regulatory capital ratios pale in comparison to the prevalence and
complexity of their strategies to manipulate the denominator. 68
In a
Securitization has played a vital role in these efforts. 69
securitization transaction, an investment vehicle purchases and pools
together various loans or other assets that have predictable future cash
streams provided by the underlying assets. Those cash streams
collateralize and fund securities that the vehicle issues to investors in
capital markets. The investment vehicle typically issues different classes
(or tranches) of securities, with senior classes having prior contractual
claims on the cash streams. The tranches thus offer investors different
mixes of risk and reward. 70
Securitization has evolved into numerous specialized variants,
including asset-backed commercial paper. Companies seeking financing
create asset-backed commercial paper by first selling cash-producing
assets into an investment vehicle. The investment vehicle then issues

64. Id.
65. See Acharya et al., supra note 30, at 161, 175.
66. Id. at 161. Trust preferred securities were in turn securitized to develop more liquid
markets for these securities. Id.
67. Id. at 161, 176–77. The Dodd-Frank Act restricts the use of trust preferred securities for
meeting regulatory capital purposes. Id. at 176–77.
68. Jones, supra note 8, at 36.
69. Id.
70. For a description of the mechanics and economic benefits of securitization, see Gerding,
Code, Crash, and Open Source, supra note 57, at 147–49; Anand K. Bhattacharya & Frank J.
Fabozzi, Expanding Frontiers of Asset Securitization, in ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 1 (Anand K.
Bhattacharya & Frank J. Fabozzi eds., 1996); Leon T. Kendall, Securitization: A New Era in
American Finance, in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 1–8 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman
eds., 1997); Steven P. Baum, The Securitization of Commercial Property Debt, in A PRIMER ON
SECURITIZATION 45; Joshua Coval et al., The Economics of Structured Finance, 23 J. ECON. PERSP. 3
(2009).
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short term securities with maturities of between 90 and 180 days. 71
Aside from issuing securities with shorter maturities, asset-backed
commercial paper differs from traditional securitization in several other
respects. First, the investment vehicle in asset-backed commercial
paper, called a “conduit,” may purchase a revolving set of assets that
may change over time. 72 Second, as commercial paper matures, the
conduit will issue new paper to investors, the proceeds of which will be
used to purchase fresh assets and pay the fees of the various service
providers to the transaction. 73 These first two features mean that
conduits may suffer an asset-liability mismatch, as they have short-term
obligations to investors, yet hold longer-term assets. This mismatch
potential leads to a third feature of asset-backed commercial paper that
differs from traditional securitizations: in exchange for a fee, a third
party often agrees to provide liquidity support to the vehicle in the form
of infusions of cash or liquid assets as needed. 74 Like securitizations,
asset-backed commercial paper issuances often include credit support
(in the form of bond insurance, credit derivatives, or other financial
guarantees) from another financial institution. 75
Securitization, in whatever form, offers the lenders who sell assets
to an investment vehicle for cash a way to solve a mismatch between
long-term assets and short-term liabilities. It affords investors the
ability to participate in lending markets with securities that
(theoretically) can be more liquid than loans themselves and that are
tailored to particular investment needs. More generally, securitization
provides a mechanism to transfer and spread credit risk from lenders to
investors. 76
Yet securitization has also been a valuable tool in gaming
regulations. This latter role may have eclipsed its other economic
benefits. The use of securitization in regulatory capital arbitrage may be
understood through two insights. First, securitization can game the fact
that traditional capital regulations place assets in certain risk buckets.
By unbundling and reassembling the cash streams and risk from
underlying assets, securitization allows firms to create tranches of
instruments that qualify for a particular regulatory bucket. Yet these
financial firms can then secretly “stuff” more economic risk into a
71. Viral V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Causes of the Financial Crisis, 21 CRIT. REV. 195,
201 (2009).
72. FITCH RATINGS, ASSET-BACKED COMMERCIAL PAPER EXPLAINED 1 (2001).
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~igiddy/ABS/fitchabcp.pdf [https://perma.cc/6XYW-PD5K].
73. Id.
74. Viral V. Acharya et al., Securitization Without Risk Transfer 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research Working Paper No. 15730, 2010).
75. In addition, some conduits purchase a mix of different assets to diversify the portfolio.
FITCH RATINGS, supra note 72.
76. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source, supra note 57, at 148–49.
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particular tranche than regulators assumed when they created the risk
weight for that bucket. 77
Second, securitization plays with the regulatory treatment of
guarantees. David Jones explains this using the following example.
Assume a firm has a balance sheet with assets of $100 in loans, liabilities
of $95 in deposits, and $5 in equity. This firm’s implied leverage ratio is
thus 5%. If a firm were to sell $50 in loans to a third party and provide
an off-balance sheet guarantee for those loans (for example, through a
standby letter of credit or other form of credit enhancement), it would
have the same economic risk. Yet its capital ratio per its balance sheet
would dramatically improve, jumping to 10% ($5 in equity divided by
$50 in on-balance sheet loans). 78 The first two Basel Accords prohibit
this simple form of regulatory capital arbitrage by imposing regulatory
capital requirements on financial guarantees. The Accords require that
when the bank issues a guarantee on assets that it has sold itself, the
guarantee is deemed to be “recourse.” This generally means that the
bank must maintain capital equal to the bank’s maximum potential
credit loss under the guarantee. Nevertheless, banks use securitization
and other shadow banking instruments to create effective guarantees
that do not require that the financial institution maintain regulatory
capital for the full amount of economic risk the banks retain. 79

B. Six Strategies for Regulatory Capital Arbitrage
These two insights—the capacity of securitization to manipulate
regulatory risk buckets and the creative use of guarantees—help explain
six common strategies for regulatory capital arbitrage:
1. Concentrating Credit Risk and Cherry Picking
Under the first strategy, banks structure asset-backed securities so
that subordinated tranches of asset-backed securities bear high
concentrations of economic risk (that is, they are more at risk for loss
should the loans that back the securitization default). Yet, these junior
tranches of asset-backed securities are subject to low relatively low
regulatory capital requirements; in other words, the capital that a bank
must maintain against these securities according to regulation is lower
than appropriate given the true economic risk of those securities. The
senior tranches in the securitization contain a correspondingly low
degree of economic risk, but would require relatively higher capital;
77. Jones, supra note 8, at 41–44.
78. Id. at 40.
79. Id. at 40–42.
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they would bear the brunt of the regulatory capital requirements. The
issuing bank then retains the subordinated securities and sells the senior
securities to outside investors. 80
Scholars have also claimed that banks used the flip side of the same
strategy: banks would securitize assets and then purchase the resultant
AAA-rated senior securities. These securities would contain more
economic risk than assumed by the regulatory capital requirements. 81
These AAA-rated securities were treated as having minimal credit risk
and no liquidity or funding risk. 82 Banks could thus have their cake
(enjoy fat premiums on their asset-backed security investments, which
were particularly high for securitizations backed by subprime
mortgages) and eat it too (lower their regulatory capital below
economic risk). 83
2. Remote Origination
The second strategy is to ensure “remote origination,” namely that
the issuer of the asset-backed securities is not affiliated with the original
lender that made the underlying loans. Securitizations involve remote
originators for many reasons (primarily bankruptcy). 84 However, bank
regulations provide another reason; capital regulations historically
required only an 8% capital ratio if the bank issued a guarantee of loans
owned by someone else. This provides an explanation for one structural
feature of some asset-backed commercial paper programs: the credit
enhancements provided by the sponsoring bank require lower capital
when some other entity (other than the sponsoring bank) originates the
assets that will back the commercial paper sold to investors. 85
Remote origination also had benefits for the lenders. By selling
loans into a securitization, these lenders were able to move those assets
off their balance sheets. The lenders could then hold little or no capital
against those assets on the theory that they bore minimal risk for those
assets. However, the Financial Crisis and the collapse of investor
demand for mortgage-backed securities revealed that originating

149.

80. Id. at 42–44.
81. Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, supra note 30, at

82. Id. at 148.
83. Acharya & Richardson, supra note 71, at 204–05.
84. If the originator is deemed to have made a “true sale” of the assets to the structured
investment vehicle, the assets are no longer considered part of the estate of the originator in
bankruptcy. The structured investment vehicle is then the outright owner of the mortgages or other
assets, and the originator no longer has any impact on the risk being transferred from borrowers to
the structured investment vehicle and investors. Originating lenders would often transfer assets to
securitization vehicles via one or more intermediate trusts to further ensure bankruptcy remoteness.
For a discussion of “true sales” in securitizations, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization Post-Enron,
25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539, 1543–48 (2004).
85. Jones, supra note 8, at 44–45.
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lenders in fact continued to bear substantial risk even for assets they
sold. 86 Originating banks (and other mortgage lenders) were subject to
warehouse risk, i.e., the risk of being unable to sell mortgages they
originated and offload the credit, liquidity, and interest rate risk
associated with those loans. 87
Moreover, even when banks successfully sold loans into a
securitization, they may also have had recourse obligations for those
assets. 88 Although accounting and bank regulatory capital standards
may have treated the likelihood of these obligations being triggered as
remote, these obligations caused significant losses for banks and other
financial institutions. 89 Indeed, large financial institutions that sold
mortgages into securitizations have agreed to settlements totaling
billions of dollars because those mortgages violated representations and
warranties about mortgage quality and underwriting standards. This
massive recourse liability meant that a significant amount of risk that
banks moved off their balance sheet in securitizations eventually
rematerialized on their financial statements. 90
3. Indirect Credit Enhancements and Creative Guarantees
The third strategy exploits the regulatory treatment of other forms
of economic guarantees provided by banks for securitization vehicles.
In essence, these guarantors bear more economic risk than suggested by
the regulatory capital required. 91
For example, banks carefully structured the liquidity enhancements
that they provided to asset-backed commercial paper vehicles to obtain
lower risk weights for these guarantees under capital regulations. 92
86. Erik F. Gerding, Bank Regulation and Securitization: How the Law Improved Transmission
Lines Between Real Estate and Banking Crises, 50 GA. L. REV. 89, 116 (2015). See FIN. CRISIS

INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT 74 (2011) (explaining how mortgage
originators were adversely affected when investor demand for “risky assets” sharply declined).
87. Gerding, supra note 86, at 116; Adrian D’Silva & Brian Gordon, Hedges in the Warehouse:
The Banks Get Trimmed, (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi. Fin. Mkts. Grp., Policy Discussion Paper, No.
available
at
2008-5,
2008),
http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/policy_discussion_papers/ 2008/PDP2008-5.pdf.
88. Gerding, supra note 86, at 116; Erik F. Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and Its Legal
Origins 42 (Aug. 23, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (explaining the imposition
of
regulatory
capital
requirements)
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990816 (giving an example of when a bank may
be exposed to a recourse obligation). Securitization sponsors may also have obligations to warehouse
lenders. See
Richard Stanton, Johan Walden & Nancy Wallace, The Industrial Organization of the US
Residential Mortgage Market, 6 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 259, 271 (2014) (relating New Century’s
inability to pay the margin calls made by its warehouse lenders).
89. Gerding, supra note 86, at 116. See Stanton, Walden & Wallace, supra note 88, at 271
(discussing New Century’s inability to satisfy its obligations).
90. Gerding, supra note 86, at 116. See e.g., Andrew Grossman & Christina Rexrode,
Citigroup to Pay $7 Billion in Mortgage Probe, WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2014).
91. Id. at 45–46.
92. Id.; see also Acharya et al., Securitization Without Risk Transfer, supra note 74; Acharya et
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Careful structuring allowed banks that provided liquidity enhancements
to maintain only 0.8% capital against the value of assets in the assetbacked commercial paper vehicle (compared to the 8% capital that
would be required had these assets been on the bank’s balance sheet). 93
On the assumption that there was minimal risk that these guarantees
would be triggered, U.S. bank regulators effectively exempted these
liquidity enhancements from capital requirements for the sponsoring
banks. 94 The asset-backed commercial paper market responded with
explosive growth. It doubled from $600 billion outstanding in 2004 to
$1.2 trillion outstanding as of the second quarter of 2007. 95
The market freeze during the Financial Crisis triggered these
liquidity guarantees and revealed the mistake of this light regulatory
capital treatment. 96 Asset-backed commercial paper transactions were
structured so that, when the crisis struck, investors bore only 4.3% of
the loss of the $1.25 trillion outstanding in asset-backed commercial
paper. Guarantors bore the remainder. 97 Empirical studies show when
asset-backed commercial paper investment vehicles suffered losses
during the Crisis, sponsoring banks—and not investors—generally bore
the losses. 98 Risk materialized on the balance sheets of sponsoring
banks despite the light capital treatment. 99 This led several scholars to
brand asset-backed commercial paper as “securitization without risk
transfer” and to conclude that a primary driver of these securitization
structures was regulatory capital arbitrage. 100
In addition to liquidity enhancements, banks designed other
creative, indirect guarantees. For example, banks designed complex
credit enhancements for those securitizations that resembled revolving
credit facilities, such as collateralized loan agreements (a form of
collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”)) and securitizations of credit
card receivables. 101
Careful structuring meant that these credit
al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, supra note 30, at 148.
93. Viral V. Acharya & Phillip Schnabl, Do Global Banks Spread Global Imbalances? AssetBacked Commercial Paper During the Financial Crisis of 2007-09, 58 IMF ECON. REV. 37, 50 (2010).
94. Acharya et al., Securitization Without Risk Transfer, supra note 74, at 12.
95. See Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, supra note 30,
at 148–49.
96. Acharya et al., Securitization Without Risk Transfer, supra note 74; Acharya et al., Capital,
Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, supra note 30, at 148.
97. See Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, supra note 30,
at 149.
98. Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 93, at 61–63.
99. Id.
100. Acharya et al., Securitization Without Risk Transfer, supra note 74, at 31–34.
101. Jones, supra note 8, at 46. The assets backing these securitizations may be paid off
(“drawdowns”) by borrowers quickly, yet investors purchasing the asset-backed securities may prefer
a much longer maturity on their securities. Id. Banks sponsoring these securitizations covered any
potential resulting mismatches between an investment vehicle’s fluctuating assets and its issued
securities by creating “master trusts.” Id. at 46–47. Under these trusts, the bank “designates” lines of
credit for the investment vehicle. Id. at 46–47.
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enhancements required no or minimal regulatory capital for the banks
that provided them. 102
Still other guarantees from banks and financial institutions were
implicit. Although many sponsors of securitizations had no contractual
obligation to support a failing investment vehicle, the marketplace
expected that the firm would step in should the vehicle experience
extreme losses. 103 A financial institution that failed to honor these
expectations might suffer a severe reputation loss and be unable to find
financing in the future. 104 Scholars have found that, to avoid this fate,
sponsors would go to great lengths to support investment vehicles. 105 If
sponsors of securitization could provide “moral recourse” for these
vehicles without agreeing explicitly and contractually to provide a
guarantee, they could avoid capital requirements and other legal
costs. 106
4. Third-Party Guarantees
Banks also engaged in regulatory capital arbitrage when they
purchased asset-backed securities that enjoyed third-party guarantees
via credit derivatives or bond insurance. Those guarantees allowed the
banks that invested in senior asset-backed securities to maintain as little
as zero capital against those investments. Regulations allowed banks to
maintain no capital even though capital markets priced the credit risk on
those assets (when adjusted for the guarantees) at more than zero.
Banks widely exploited this loophole. For example, AIG’s 2007 Annual
Report disclosed that $379 billion of its $527 billion credit derivative
exposure (created by its infamous Financial Products Group)
represented derivatives sold to financial institutions seeking to engage in
this form of regulatory capital arbitrage. 107
102. The sponsoring bank’s credit exposure under these lines of credit was considered minimal.

Id. Thus, a bank’s credit enhancement was considered to constitute not credit risk (which would

require regulatory capital under Basel), but operational risk (which would not require regulatory
capital). Id.
103. Gary B. Gorton & Nicholas S. Souleles, Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization, in THE
RISKS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 549, 551–52 (Mark Carey & René M. Stulz eds. 2007). Gorton
and Souleles provide a model for implicit recourse. Id. at 575–78. The model explains how “[t]he
sponsoring bank and the investors in the SPV collude in adopting a contractual mechanism that
cannot be written down because of accounting and regulatory rules.” Id. at 576.
104. Id. As financial institutions judged that the probability of this non-contractual liability was
low, they decided that they did not need to treat these moral recourse obligations as a balance sheet
liability. Stephen G. Ryan, Accounting in and for the Subprime Crisis, 83 ACCT. REV. 1605, 1632
(2008).
105. Gorton & Souleles, supra note 103, at 565 (surveying others studies finding moral recourse),
580–87 (testing for and finding evidence of marketplace assumption of moral recourse by
securitization sponsors).
106. See generally id. (discussing how regulators recognized the problem of moral recourse, but
providing tests that show sponsors of securitizations nonetheless appear to have provided noncontractual guarantees).
107. Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, supra note 30, at
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5. Moving Assets from Banking Book to Trading Book
The 1997 Market Risk Amendment to the Basel Accords facilitated
additional forms of regulatory capital arbitrage. These amendments
allowed certain banks to set regulatory capital for certain risks in their
trading books. This encouraged banks to move asset-backed securities
and other shadow banking instruments from their banking books to
their trading books to lower their regulatory capital dramatically. 108
6. Exploiting Basel II’s Do-it-Yourself Capital Requirements
As noted above, the Basel II Accord allowed certain large financial
institutions to set their own regulatory capital levels according to their
proprietary risk models.
When the Securities and Exchange
Commission extended this approach to certain large investment banking
conglomerates, many of those firms dramatically increased their
leverage ratios to over 30:1 within a three-year span. 109 In other words,
financial institutions used these models to lower their capital
requirements. 110 Financial institutions used these same models to
measure firm risk management policies and price asset-backed
securities, credit derivatives, and other shadow banking instruments. 111

C. Regulatory Capital Arbitrage as Compound Arbitrage; Rating
Agencies
Many of the six evasion strategies described above depended on
asset-backed securities or other shadow banking instruments and
counterparties receiving investment grade ratings from credit rating
agencies. 112 Financial institutions played a different set of games to
achieve higher ratings. For example, scholars have examined how the
financial institutions that designed and marketed asset-backed securities
shopped among rating agency firms for higher ratings. The firms that
put together securitizations determined which ratings firm would get
hired for a particular transaction. Competition among ratings firms,
combined with negligible liability for giving unwarranted investment
grade ratings, created perverse incentives for the agencies to please the
firms holding the purse strings. 113
149–50.
108. Jones, supra note 8, at 48; see also Robert P. Bartlett, III, Making Banks Transparent, 65
VAND. L. REV. 293 (2012).
109. See Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source, supra note 57, at 159 (citing Stephen Labaton,
Agency’s ‘04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at A1).
110. See Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source, supra note 57, at 154–59.
111. Id. at 139–43, 147–64.
112. Acharya & Schnabl, supra note 93, at 85.
113. Edward I. Altman et al., Regulation of Rating Agencies, in REGULATING WALL STREET,
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The gaming of rating agencies may have taken even more
sophisticated forms. In the wake of the SEC’s 2010 lawsuit against
Goldman Sachs, newspapers reported that the investment bank took
advantage of a decision by rating agencies to disclose their
methodologies in rating asset-backed securities. Using this disclosure,
Goldman Sachs and other banks were able to reverse engineer rating
agency models and then obtain higher and unjustified ratings for riskier
asset-backed securities. 114 In short, even regulation outsourced to
private entities can suffer from regulatory arbitrage. 115 These various
games that financial institutions played with rating agencies assumed
fresh importance in the context of regulatory capital arbitrage; these
games further undermined capital regulations.
Similarly, interpretations of bank regulators that allowed lenders to
lower their regulatory capital requirements by securitizing assets
depended on the securitization qualifying as a true sale for bankruptcy
and accounting purposes. 116 Thus the gaming of bankruptcy and

supra note 30, at 443, 448–53 (describing conflict of interest when issuer of securities pays rating

agencies for rating).
Law Professor Frank Partnoy has been a longtime critic of rating agency regulations.
Professor Partnoy has long argued that regulation is part of the problem. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy,
The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77
WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 681 (1999). Instead of creating incentives for better monitoring, regulators have
undermined those incentives by granting rating agencies a kind of oligopoly power. See id. at 698.
This power stems from the fact that the securitization market, including the market for mortgagebacked securities, focuses largely on institutional investors. Kendall, supra note 70, at 15.
Many of these institutional investors are restricted by regulation to purchasing only
securities with an investment-grade credit rating. E.g., James Hedges, Hedge Fund Transparency, in
HEDGE FUNDS: STRATEGIES, RISK ASSESSMENT, AND RETURNS 315, 316 (Greg N. Gregoriou et al.
eds., 2003) (discussing regulations that discourage mutual funds from investing in debt below
investment grade). For example, regulations restrict much of the securities investments of many
pension funds, and regulated financial institutions, including banks and insurance companies, to
investment-grade debt. See, e.g., GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT LOANS: SECURITIZATION FACES SIGNIFICANT BARRIERS 41 n.41 (2003) (discussing
requirements on pension funds); Partnoy, supra, at 700–01 (outlining use by state regulators of rating
agencies’ ratings in insurance regulations).
These “investment-grade” restrictions are designed to ensure the safety of an entity’s assets,
and, in the case of a bank or other regulated financial institution, to mitigate systemic risk. Cf. Viral
V. Acharya, A Theory of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regulation (Jan. 9, 2001)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(available
for
download
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=236401
[https://perma.cc/C8L3-B7DM])
(analyzing whether prudential bank regulations, including limitations on investments, mitigates
systemic risk).
These investment-grade regulations, in turn, provide that only rating agencies that have a
special license from the Securities and Exchange Commission as “Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organizations” (“NRSROs”) can give an investment-grade rating. Partnoy, supra, at 623.
The handful of NRSROs, and the models they use to rate securities, thus possess great
responsibility for regulating the riskiness of investments made by a large number of financial
institutions. Professor Partnoy contends that rating agencies rent out the regulatory license they
enjoy by virtue of this web of regulations. See Partnoy, supra, at 623–24.
114. Gretchen Morgenson & Louise Story, Rating Agency Data Aided Wall Street in Deals,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2010 at A1.
115. See generally Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source, supra note 57.
116. MELANIE L. FEIN, SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS § 13.04 (3d ed. Supp. 2010).
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accounting rules also contributed to regulatory capital arbitrage. 117
V. THE CRISIS AND THE EFFECTS OF REGULATORY CAPITAL
ARBITRAGE
Taking a step back from individual arbitrage strategies, a troubling
picture of the effect of regulatory capital arbitrage emerges. Although
the various shadow banking instruments were designed to spread risk,
most of the credit risk stayed within the financial system. A 2008 study
reports that banks, thrifts, government-sponsored entities, and brokerdealers held $789 billion—or roughly 50%—of the AAA-rated CDO
tranches outstanding. 118 At the same point, banks, broker-dealers and
monoline bond insurers held $320 billion of the $476 billion of
subordinated CDO tranches. 119 A 2008 International Monetary Fund
report documented how balance sheets of a sample of ten very large
financial institutions doubled from 2004 to 2007, yet the implied risk of
their balance sheets under the Basel Accord registered only a modest
uptick. 120
This suggests that the most troubling problem with securitization
(and shadow banking generally) is not that financial institutions
unloaded high credit risk assets onto non-financial institution investors.
On the contrary, too much of the toxic risk stayed on the balance sheets
of financial institutions or was passed from one institution to another. 121
The system did not diffuse risk, but hid, recycled, and concentrated it in
complex daisy chains. Securitization only pantomimed its stated role of
transferring risk in the service of letting banks escape capital rules.
Professors Acharya and Richardson explain that this evasion of capital
regulations was the driving force behind securitization in the years
leading up to the Crisis. They write:
[E]specially from 2003 to 2007, the main purpose of securitization was not
to share risk with investors, but to make an end run around capitaladequacy regulations. The net result was to keep the risk concentrated in
the financial institutions—and, indeed, to keep the risk at a greatly
magnified level, because of the over-leveraging it allowed. 122

These statistics support the earlier predictions of scholars on the
pernicious effects of regulatory capital arbitrage. Well before the Crisis,
some scholars worried that regulatory capital arbitrage would result in
117. See supra Part IV.A.
118. See Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, supra note 30,
at 149.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 150 (citing INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT:
CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISKS AND RESTORING FINANCIAL SOUNDNESS 31 (2008)
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/01/pdf/text.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HLT-E6L6]).
121. See Hyun Song Shin, Securitisation and Financial Stability, 119 ECON. J. 309 (2009).
122. Acharya & Richardson, supra note 71, at 197 (2009).
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an effective deterioration of risk-based capital standards. 123 They
worried that regulatory capital arbitrage could mask growing financial
problems at banks and frustrate both market discipline and regulatory
actions to address failing banks. 124 Some scholars attribute the fact that
many large complex financial institutions that failed during the Crisis—
Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual, Lehman Brothers, Wachovia, and
Merrill Lynch—actually had higher capital than required by regulation
to regulatory capital arbitrage. This arbitrage masked the true
economic risk of these firms. 125 Moreover, regulatory capital arbitrage
can discourage a true hedging of economic risks. 126 As already noted,
higher leverage can effectively externalize more of a firm’s risk on the
marketplace and on the government. 127
VI. CONCLUSION: COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEMS AND SOLUTIONS,
SIMPLE AND HIGH TECH
Regulatory arbitrage, in general, and regulatory capital arbitrage,
in particular, will remain features of the landscape of the financial
markets and financial regulation well into the future. Financial
institutions and other market participants have strong incentives to
game financial rules that restrict their risk-taking and profits. Financial
institutions have particularly sharp incentives to engage in regulatory
capital arbitrage. The presence of government guarantees—explicit and
implicit—and externalities from the failure of financial institutions
continue to make debt relatively cheaper than equity for financial
institutions. This creates a strong impulse for financial institutions to
lever up, using investment structuring and switching, to sidestep legal
rules restricting their ability to increase leverage or risk-taking.
Moreover, the capacity of leverage to turbocharge returns to equity
holders, including bank managers and traders compensated through
stock or options, creates internal pressures on the banks to find creative
and opaque ways to finance themselves through debt.
This explains the dialectical co-evolution of capital regulations and
regulatory capital arbitrage described above. Regulators must impose
capital requirements to reduce the systemic effects of excessive financial
institution leverage and the moral hazard from government guarantees.
However, each and every historical attempt to set capital requirements
123. Jones, supra note 8, at 49.
124. Id.
125. See Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, supra note 30,
at 147.
126. Jones, supra note 8, at 37.
127. See Acharya et al., Capital, Contingent Capital, and Liquidity Requirements, supra note 30,
at 157; see also Acharya & Richardson, supra note 71, at 197–98.
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has resulted in new forms of regulatory capital arbitrage. The United
States and Britain worried that their early regulatory capital
requirements would drive capital overseas to less regulated jurisdictions.
This resulted in the first Basel Accord. Yet financial institutions found
ways to game that agreement’s crude risk-bucket approach. So bank
regulators responded with the Basel II Accord and allowed large banks
to set capital according to their proprietary risk models.
Not
surprisingly, financial conglomerates used this approach to lower
effective capital and raise leverage. Now regulators have rolled out
Basel III. To quote Kurt Vonnegut, “and so it goes.” 128
The incentives to engage in regulatory arbitrage and regulatory
capital arbitrage increase during prolonged market bubbles. The
prospect of being shut out of enjoying the increased profits in a booming
asset market sharpens the legal creativity and appetite for legal risk of
investors and financial institutions. In turn, increased regulatory
arbitrage, particularly of rules like capital requirements that arguably
might otherwise throttle back lending or investment, can, in turn,
further inflate a bubble. 129
Addressing the pervasive and recurring effects of regulatory capital
arbitrage demand both new intellectual frameworks and new policy
approaches. This final part of the Article first attempts to reframe the
problem of regulatory capital arbitrage and its dialectical evolution with
capital rules in terms of research into complex, adaptive systems. The
Article next briefly examines how the upshot of regulatory capital
arbitrage may be that bank capital requirements and other prudential
banking regulations may suffer from inherent instability. Finally, the
Article describes two policy approaches to addressing this instability,
specifically: “simple” and “complex.”

A. Complex Adaptive Systems
A different scholarly lens can reveal deeper patterns in the
interaction of capital regulation and regulatory capital arbitrage.
Research into complex adaptive systems may help explain the
regulatory arbitrage described above. 130 Complex adaptive systems are
the centerpiece of complexity science, a somewhat amorphous,
interdisciplinary field that engages economists, computer scientists, and
natural scientists. These scholars study how simple interactions between
128. See generally KURT VONNEGUT, SLAUGHTERHOUSE-FIVE (The Dial Press 2005) (1969).
129. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 20, at 383.
130. For a provocative application of complex adaptive systems to financial institution
regulation, see Lawrence G. Baxter, Internationalization of Law: The “Complex” Case of Bank
Regulation, in THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF LAW: LEGISLATING, DECISION-MAKING, PRACTICE
AND EDUCATION 3 (William Van Caenegem & Mary E. Hiscock eds. 2010).

GERDING (DO NOT DELETE)

380

5/2/2016 12:26 PM

Washburn Law Journal

[Vol. 55

adaptive agents (which could mean anything from investors in a market,
to organisms in an ecosystem, to cells within an organism) can evolve
into increasingly intricate and dynamically changing adaptive systems. 131
The ability of agents to adapt to the changes in the system, including
those caused by the interaction of the agents, leads the overall system—
the market, ecosystem, or organism—to develop in nonlinear ways. 132
Economists have looked at how a financial market represents a
complex adaptive system 133 and may therefore exhibit nonlinear
behavior 134 and suffer bouts of disequilibrium and unpredictable
swings. 135 Accordingly, models of market risk may suffer spectacular
failures. 136
If a financial market is a complex adaptive system, then so too is a
regulated financial market. The agents in the system are financial
market traders and the regulators looking to govern the risk-taking of
those traders. As regulators set rules for the market, the traders (with
the help of their lawyers) find ways to adapt around these rules or to
move capital to a less regulated part of the system. The co-evolution of
financial regulation and regulatory arbitrage provides an example of
what scholars of complex adaptive systems call “emergence.” Legal
scholar J.B. Ruhl defines emergence as:
[T]he appearance of unforeseen qualities from the self-organizing
interaction of large numbers of objects, which cannot be understood
through study of any one of the objects. The key to emergence is
understanding that the emergent behaviors of dynamical systems are highlevel patterns arising from the indescribably complex interaction of lowerlevel subsystems. Hence, removing or otherwise changing any interacting
131. Complex adaptive systems are systems in which multiple independent agents interact with
one another. The capacity of the agents to adapt to changes in the system causes the system to
evolve into progressively more complex forms and to change in a non-linear manner. Simon A.
Levin, Complex Adaptive Systems: Exploring the Known, Unknown and the Unknowable, 40 BULL.
AM. MATH. SOC’Y 3, 4 (2002) (defining complex adaptive systems).
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Cars H. Hommes, Financial Markets as Nonlinear Adaptive Evolutionary
Systems, 1 QUANTITATIVE FIN. 149 (2001).
134. Risk models or regulations that rely on linear causality falter when applied to complex
adaptive systems. Professor J.B. Ruhl has written extensively on the failures of law to manage nonlinear causality. See J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System:
How to Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 933,
979 (1997) (criticizing environmental statutes for this flaw).
135. John Foster, From Simplistic to Complex Systems in Economics, 29 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON.
873 (2005). Many complex, adaptive systems may tend towards disequilibrium because of the
concept of emergence, which is described supra note 132. Ruhl, supra note 134, at 990–91.
136. See generally Alejandro Reveiz Herault & Sebastian Rojas, The Case for Active
Management from the Perspective of Complexity Theory, 495 BORRADORES DE ECONOMÍA 11
(2008), http://www.banrep.gov.co/docum/ftp/borra495.pdf [https://perma.cc/879D-8NU5]; cf. CARLO
C. JAEGER ET AL., RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND RATIONAL ACTION (2001). Legal scholars have
analyzed how individuals severely underestimate risk when confronted with complex adaptive
systems. E.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Hazard in Auditing and the Need to
Restructure the Industry Before it Unravels, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1698, 1724–26 (2006) (discussing
accounting firms’ underestimation of their legal exposure); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham, From
Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546 (1994).
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component of the system potentially changes the entire system since the
interactions leading to the global emergent behaviors may no longer be
possible. 137

Emergence and the complex interactions of agents on the micro level
frustrate the prediction of changes to the overall system. 138
One could analogize the complex adaptive system of a regulated
financial market to a petri dish in which traders and regulators adapt to
one another. This interaction may make predictions about the stability
of financial markets and regulation hard enough in normal times. Asset
price bubbles place that petri dish under a heat lamp. The heat creates
the conditions for frenzies of regulatory arbitrage that destabilize the
architecture of financial regulation. 139

B. The Inherent Instability of Capital Regulations
The system tends toward complexity and capital regulations tend to
be unstable because of the congenital incentives of financial firms to
increase leverage. As noted in Part III above, those incentives stem not
merely from the moral hazard created by government guarantees,
explicit and implicit, of banks and their creditors, but moreover from the
fundamental market failure those guarantees aim to remedy: the
externalities that banks threaten to impose on the wider economy when
they fail. These potentially severe externalities mean governments feel
compelled to backstop banks and their creditors, which creates an
incentive for banks to over-lever, take excessive risk and find ways
around capital requirements. These externalities threaten to destabilize
not only capital rules, but a spectrum of prudential regulations that limit
bank risk-taking and mitigate systemic risk. These externalities have
also sparked a scholarly gold rush to identify the conditions that created
the “Quiet Period,” the decades between the end of the Second World
War and the 1970s in which the architecture of financial institution
regulation remained remarkably stable and few firms sought to engage
in massive and sustained regulatory arbitrage of the rules of the game. 140

137. J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-And-Society System:
A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849,

877–78 (1996) (internal quotations omitted).
138. See id.
139. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 20, at 240–47
(describing how dynamics of bubbles promote conditions for regulatory arbitrage of financial
regulations that restrict lending and investment).
140. E.g., Prasad Krishnamurthy, Regulating through Rents (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the author); see generally GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF
2007 54–55 (2010) (providing explanation for the Quiet Period); GARY B. GORTON,
MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DIDN’T SEE ONE COMING 10–28, 125–33 (2012)
(defining historical characteristics of a “Quiet Period” in banking system, and analyzing conditions
leading to post-war “Quiet Period”).
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C. Solutions
Unless and until those conditions can be identified and recreated,
policymakers must cobble together responses to the continuously
evolving threat that regulatory capital arbitrage poses to bank capital
regulations and that regulatory arbitrage more generally poses to any
prudential, systemic-risk reducing regulation.
Conceptually,
policymakers can proceed down one of two broad avenues.
1. Simple: Dogs and Frisbees
First, regulators can address the threat of regulatory capital
arbitrage with broad simple rule structures that might be labelled
(affectionately or not) as “stone axe.” For example, Professors Admati
and Hellwig argue for relatively simple leverage caps that are fixed at
very high levels. 141 High capital would not only absorb more bank
losses, it would also compensate for some erosion of legal rules by
regulatory arbitrage. As noted above, Heidi Mandanis Schooner adds a
procedural, yet still elegant twist to this reform proposal. She argues for
a presumption of high capital requirements for all banks, which an
individual bank might convince a regulator to lower with sufficient
evidence that the bank’s risk profile is small. 142
Professor Schooner’s elegant approach might be taken several
steps further. Policymakers might use presumptions in a host of ways to
address regulatory capital arbitrage. For example, new financial
instruments or complex financing transactions might be presumptively
off limits for a bank absent it demonstrating to regulators that these
innovations do not pose a risk to the bank or to the financial system. A
bank might also have to show that a complex financing transaction has
economic substance beyond gaming regulations. Regulators might
sunset approvals of financial innovations or automatically reset capital
rules to high levels unless a bank can periodically produce evidence that
a complex instrument or transaction continues to be low risk and have
economic substance. This type of presumption meshes with a wave of
scholarship that calls for greater use of licensing regimes in financial
regulation. 143
There is quite a bit of intellectual heft behind simple rules. For
example, Andrew Haldane, in his famous “Dog and the Frisbee”
141. ADMATI & HELLWIG, supra note 1.
142. Schooner, supra note 7.
143. Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, An FDA for Financial Innovation: Applying the Insurable
Interest Doctrine to Twenty-First-Century Financial Markets, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1307 (2015); Saule
T. Omarova, License to Deal: Mandatory Approval of Complex Financial Products, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 63 (2012). See also Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L.
REV 1 (2008).
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speech, 144 makes a strong case for simple regulatory approaches to the
complex problems of modern financial institutions and markets. Simple
rules have several virtues. They do not overtax the cognitive abilities
and institutional capacities of regulators. Regulators are less prone to
behavioral biases and other cognitive errors when implementing and
enforcing simple rules. 145 Simple rules also have political virtues. They
are easier to understand, explain, justify to the public, and defend
publicly, and they make it easier to monitor regulator behavior.
However, simple, blunt rules have drawbacks. Simple but much
higher capital requirements invite financial institutions to find ways to
load their balance sheet with riskier assets. Moreover, if capital
requirements are sufficiently high, they encourage investors to move
their money away from regulated banks to less regulated competitors.
These competitors could make investments more freely and offer their
shareholders the possibility of the turbocharged returns that come with
leverage. This sort of investment switching can be seen in the rise of
money market mutual funds in the 1970s. Those funds attracted
investors away from banks who could offer only regulation-capped
interest rates on deposits. 146 The concern with investment switching and
regulatory arbitrage is voiced by critics who argue that increased
regulation will drive finance further into the less regulated
“shadows.” 147 There are many reasons not to take this argument at face
value: not least because banks and regulated entities have been key
enablers of the shadow banking system. 148 Nevertheless, higher bank
capital requirements will create strong incentives for banks to engage in
regulatory capital arbitrage, 149 including strategies employing lessregulated affiliates. 150 Regulation might then need to address capital
flows into parallel financial systems that are less regulated than
depository banking but perform the same economic functions and
threaten the same systemic risk spillover effects.

144. Andrew G. Haldane, Executive Director, Financial Stability, Bank of England, & Vasileios
Madouros, Economist, Bank of England, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s
366th economic policy symposium, “The Changing Policy Landscape,” Jackson Hole, WY (Aug. 31,
2012) http://www.bis.org/review/r120905a.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7K6-6DDH].
145. Id.
146. William A. Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money Market Funds, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 1155.
147. E.g., Gary Gorton et al., The Safe-Asset Share, 102 AMER. ECON. REV. 101 (2012).
148. Erik F. Gerding, The Shadow Banking System and its Legal Origins, (Jan. 24, 2012)
(unpublished
manuscript)
(available
for
download
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1990816 [https://perma.cc/56XQ-ZVSB]).
149. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION, supra note 20.
150. See Saule T. Omarova, From Gramm-Leach-Bliley to Dodd-Frank; the Unfulfilled Promise
of Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1683 (2011) (detailing strategies by bank
holding companies to transfer subsidies from bank subsidiaries to less regulated affiliates).
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2. High Tech: Adaptive Regulations and Adaptive Regulators
The alternative to simple rules is a complex or “high tech”
approach to regulatory capital arbitrage. Regulators could attempt to
match the complex and adaptive nature of regulatory capital arbitrage
with increasingly complex and adaptive rules. Regulators could seek to
adjust capital regulations continuously and dynamically to adapt to
evolutions in bank risk-taking and trading strategies, as well as other
financial innovations.
A dynamic, adaptive regulatory approach requires dynamic and
adaptive regulators. This, in turn, requires that regulators will have the
legal authority, the incentives, and the capacities—both cognitive and
institutional—to keep pace with industry. Legal scholarship has only
begun to consider the institutional design questions that are central to
endowing regulators with this type of authority, incentives, and
capacities. On the bright side, scholars have already proposed creative
mechanisms. For example, Brett McDonnell and Dan Schwarcz
advocate for an institutional system of “regulatory contrarians” or
gadflies operating within regulatory agencies that would push for new
regulations. 151 Eric Posner argues that cost-benefit analysis of capital
regulations, if properly done, might produce results that force regulators
to raise capital. 152 Although this last proposal presupposes that
regulators would act within an institutional environment that gives them
the requisite incentives and resources and immunizes them from
political pressures and cognitive errors. 153 I have proposed elsewhere a
range of institutional mechanisms to make financial regulators more
proactive, including the following: countercyclical regulator budgets;
think tanks, graduate colleges and policy planning staffs within agencies;
and greater use of regulatory peer review systems. 154
Yet all of these mechanisms might improve regulation even if
policymakers adopt simple approaches to regulatory capital arbitrage.
A mix of simple rules and smart financial regulators might yield the best
results against the formidable foe of regulatory arbitrage.

151. Brett McDonnell & Daniel Schwarcz, Regulatory Contrarians, 89 N.C. L. Rev. 1629 (2011).
152. Posner, supra note 5.
153. Erik F. Gerding, Cost-Benefit Analysis as a Spur to Regulate: On Eric Posner’s “How Do
Bank Regulators Determine Capital-Adequacy Requirements?,” 83 U. CHI. L. REV. ONLINE __
(forthcoming 2016).
154. GERDING, supra note 20, at 508–09.

